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Abstract 
The Malawi Kwacha was floated in February 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi has 
periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. This paper analyses the effectiveness of 
foreign exchange market interventions carried out by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. We use a 
GARCH (1, 1) model to simultaneously estimate the effect of intervention on the mean and 
volatility of the Malawi kwacha. 
 
Using monthly exchange rates and official intervention data from January 2002 to February 2006, 
the empirical results suggest that intervention activities of the Reserve Bank of Malawi affect the 
kwacha. In line with similar findings elsewhere in the literature, the paper finds that net sales of 
dollars by the Reserve Bank of Malawi depreciate, rather than appreciate, the kwacha. This effect 
is very small, however. Moreover, the paper also finds that the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
intervention reduces the volatility of the kwacha. This shows that the Reserve Bank actually 
achieves its objective of smoothing out fluctuations of the kwacha. This can be evidenced by the 
stability of the kwacha during a greater part of 2004. Thus intervention is, to some extent, used as 
an effective tool for moderating fluctuations of the kwacha. However, its effectiveness is 
constrained by the amounts of foreign exchange reserves, which are usually low.  
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1. Introduction  
Most central banks, especially in developing countries use foreign exchange market 
intervention1 as a policy tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In Malawi, the 
exchange rate was floated in February, 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
(RBM) has periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. In line with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions under the structural adjustment 
package, the RBM has also intervened to buy foreign exchange in order to build up 
reserves for the Government and moderate exchange rate fluctuations.  
There has been a lot of debate in literature on the question of whether these 
interventions affect the value of the kwacha. The main objective of the study is to 
examine the efficacy of the official intervention in foreign exchange market. 
Basically, the paper tries to answer the following questions: Floatation of the kwacha 
was intended to be market determined, but has it really been market determined? Has 
intervention influenced movements of the kwacha? Has intervention dampened and 
smoothened the volatility of the Malawi kwacha? What is the role of the balance of 
payments pressures on the direction and volatility of the Malawi kwacha?  
The issue of the effect of intervention on the exchange market in Malawi is 
significant on both research and policy fronts. Research front, because very few such 
papers have been done on Africa and only one is known to the authors. It is of policy 
interest because, if sterilized intervention has an effect on the kwacha, this offers the 
monetary authorities an additional policy tool independent from general monetary 
policy. 
In Section 2, we discuss monetary and exchange rate policy in Malawi. Section 3 
gives theoretical underpinnings and reviews recent results in recent contributions to 
empirical literature on effectiveness of central bank interventions. Section 4 outlines 
the methodology used in the paper. Section 5 summaries the main findings of our 
empirical research. Section 6 concludes the paper and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
                                                 
1Iintervention refers to official sales or purchases of foreign exchange to influence exchange rate. In this 
paper, we have used net sales of foreign exchange as our intervention variable. 
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1.2  Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Malawi 
1.2.1 Monetary Policy 
Up until late 1980s, monetary policy in Malawi was characterized by repressive 
procedures such as direct credit, interest rate ceilings, and strict controls on foreign 
exchange and capital flows. Supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Malawi went into structural adjustment programs beginning in the second half of 
1988. The programmes included liberalization of the financial sector, which meant 
that monetary policy had to shift from direct to indirect methods. This facilitated the 
conduct of monetary policy in line with macroeconomic objectives of maintaining 
sustainable growth, viable balance of payments position and stable prices. The central 
bank keeps a close eye on all indicators that would entail price developments 
including Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation, growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), monetary growth and expansion of credit. 
Table 1: Selected macroeconomic Indicators 
      2000          2001   2002     2003 2004        2005 
Real GDP 1      0.2         -4.1   1.8      3.9                5.1           1.9 
CPI inflation2       29.3 27.5     14.8        9.6              11.5            16.5 
M2 (money supply)3      47.1   22.1     25.2       29.3            29.8            14.3 
MK/USD rate3        80.09         72.15     76.69    108.57        108.94        123.63 
            Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi Monthly Economic Review, July 2003 and January 2006 
1. Annual percentage change  2. Year-on-year of inflation  3. Period average 
 
In trying to attain its goal of price stability, the Reserve Bank of Malawi establishes 
an annual inflation rate target, announced by the Minister of Finance in his Budget 
Statement to Parliament and monetary aggregates as an intermediate variable. 
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The choice of monetary policy stance adopted by a country, by and large, depends on 
the economic, financial and institutional environment within which the policy is 
operating. Currently, Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) pursues a monetary targeting 
regime, whereby the authorities aim at regulating money stock (broad money, M2), to 
levels required to support the relationship between price level and output. Broad 
money stock (M2), therefore is a nominal anchor to control inflation. Open market 
type operations remain the primary policy levers to influence liquidity. The objective 
of monetary policy is to reduce inflationary pressures by bringing inflation to the 
neighbourhood of 5-8 percent over the medium term. In this range, inflation is 
deemed less likely to distort savings and investment decisions. The conduct of 
monetary policy is under the overall leadership of the Monetary Policy Committee, 
which meets once in a month to take stock of the performance of the economy vis-à-
vis the economic program and takes a view on the expected level of inflation in the 
short to medium term. On the basis of its assessment, the Committee gives broad 
guidelines to the Open Market Desk of the Bank on what it views as the appropriate 
reserve money target by the end of the month or quarter. The information given is 
consistent with monetary policy targets. The Open Market Desk uses this information 
and other available information such as expected sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange by the Bank, maturities and new issues of Treasury bills and Government 
expected revenue and expenditure to map out a path for monetary policy intervention 
for the month.  
1.2.2 Monetary Policy Targeting 
The Reserve Bank of Malawi attempts to directly control money stock through a 
number of instruments. Although the RBM has a statutory responsibility to achieve a 
low and stable inflation at predetermined level for a given time, the nature of its 
functions make inflation targeting not an option. Inflation targeting requires some 
level of independence of the RBM, a high degree of cooperation between the Bank on 
the one hand and the Government, private sector and trade unions on the other. 
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In order to achieve the price stability objective, the Bank exerts stricter controls over 
reserve money, employing for this purpose quarterly growth targets (usaully agreed 
with the International Monetary Fund under the supported programmes). While more 
emphasis was initially put on growth in M2 aggregate, recent developments have 
indicated that M2 can better be influenced by monitoring growth in reserve money 
aggregate because the central bank has better control over the latter than the M2 
money stock. 
In order to influence growth in the money stock, the central bank increases or 
decreases the amount of reserve money by managing both the domestic and foreign 
sources of reserve money (credit from the central bank, and acquisition of foreign 
exchange by the Bank that has impact on local money creation). The central bank’s 
daily monetary management involves making estimates of banking system liquidity 
situations. Based on the outcome, the central bank decides how to intervene i.e. inject 
or withdraw liquidity from the system.  
In line with direct monetary control, RBM manages monetary conditions in the 
economy by using three main instruments namely the bank (discount) rate, Liquidity 
Reserve Requirement (LRR), and Open Markets Operations (OMO). 
1.2.2.1 Bank or Discount Rate 
The bank rate or discount rate is the rate at which the Reserve Bank charges on funds 
borrowed from it by commercial banks and the government. The rate imposes 
limitations on the capacity to borrow from the central bank. The bank rate had 
previously been set administratively but for a brief period, and during each month it 
would be set at a mark above the average 273-day Treasury bill (TB) rate of the 
previous month. As a result, increases in the Treasury bill rates would immediately be 
reflected on the bank rate. For instance in February 2001, the Bank rate had increased 
to more than 75 percent. In June 2001, the bank rate was de-linked from the TB-rate 
and begun to be set administratively by the RBM. Following this move, the RBM has 
succeeded in providing a broad benchmark for market interest rates. The effect of this 
policy is that Treasury bill rates have declined relative to their values of over 50 
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percent in early 2001 to around 25 percent in 2005. But the large drop in Treasury 
bills rate is, to an extent, attributed to fall in inflation due favourable food harvests as 
food inflation accounts for 58 percent of the inflation basket. The discount rate is an 
important barometer of monetary policy stance and its adjustment has successfully 
tended to influence lending rates in the financial system. Operationally, borrowing by 
banks is done through standing facilities window. RBM discount window was 
established in line with the ‘lender-of-last-resort’ role. Accordingly, it has continued 
to provide loans of a short-term nature (overnight) to banks in need of liquidity. 
Recently, repurchase agreements have been used quite often in order to fine-tune 
banking system’s liquidity. A commercial bank may borrow funds for a period of 7 
days maximum. The discount rate is also a penalty rate as it is usually above the 
market rates to discourage banks. 
1.2.2.2 Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR) 
LRR is one of the instruments available to RBM for controlling base money. LRR 
works by affecting the proportion of assets that banks are required to hold, and hence 
their ability to expand liquidity. In Malawi, all commercial banks are subject to the 
LRR requirement on all their domestic liabilities, and discount houses on all their 
collateralized deposits. Failure to oblige by the requirement attracts a penalty from 
the RBM.  
LRR was first applied in 1989. Initially, commercial banks were required to maintain 
a minimum equal to 20 percent of their total local currency deposits (including 
government deposits). In1995, the LRR was increased to 35 percent. In June 2004, 
the rate was adjusted downwards to 27.5 percent to-date with the callable deposits 
also adjusted to 14.5 percent.  
The use of the LRR is limited, as focus has tilted more to open market operations 
(OMO). The LRR remains generally high and this has adverse implications in the 
conduct of monetary policy. In effect the high LRR is regarded as an implicit tax on 
these institutions equivalent to interest rates that they could have earned on these 
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balances. This implicit tax on reserves when adjusted for other intermediation costs 
partly explains the wide spread between deposit and lending rates.  
But the authorities could not just ascribe to the idea of maintaining a lower LRR as its 
reduction could fuel inflationary pressures unless it is offset by other monetary 
instruments like aggressive sales of securities. It is against this reason that RBM did 
not fully comply with its previously announced LRR reduction scheme in 2004. 
Cumulative monetary overhang led to suspension of the scheme.  
1.2.2.3 Open Market Operations (OMO) 
Open Market Operations involves the deliberate buying and selling of paper by RBM 
to inject and withdraw liquidity from the financial system. OMO is conducted 
through RBM bills and repurchase agreements (repos) using Treasury bills as the 
major monetary policy instruments. Of the two, the RBM bills are the most 
commonly used. Prior to RBM bills, Treasury bills were issued for monetary policy 
purposes in addition to government finance. The Reserve Bank assumed 
responsibility over monetary Treasury bills and the proceeds were frozen till maturity. 
But in view of policy conflicts that arise from government debt management and 
monetary policy needs through issuance of Treasury bills for dual considerations 
(monetary and fiscal), the monetary policy Treasury bills were gradually phased out. 
Since 2000, RBM has been conducting OMO through primary market auctions of 
RBM bills. Since 2000, RBM has been conducting open market type operations 
through primary market auctions for liquidity management purposes to meet its 
reserve money targets.  
1.2.3 Challenges to execution of monetary policy 
Monetary targeting in Malawi, however, faces some problems such as non-guaranteed 
expectation that the relationship between the supply of money and inflation is stable 
and predictable. This is manifest in the apparent missing of targets more frequently. 
But despite being imprecise, the relationship has been judged to be sufficiently stable 
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to serve as a useful guide to policy. This therefore justifies the medium term inflation 
objective of 5-8 percent. 
Fiscal overruns have been associated with monetization of the deficit, crowding-out 
of credit to the private sector and worsening inflation position. Associated with fiscal 
overruns also, have been massive increases in banking system credit, especially in the 
context of donors curtailing support because of concerns about governance.  In simple 
terms, fiscal expansion and the related large fiscal deficits have affected the efficacy 
of monetary policy.  
 
1.3.2 Exchange rate policy 
1.3.2.1 Evolution of the Exchange Rate 
 
Malawi’s exchange rate has evolved over time responding to the economic  
circumstances that have prevailed at particular times. The management of the 
exchange rate in Malawi has been pursued with three major policy objectives in  
mind. These are: 
i. Maintenance of a sustainable balance of payments position 
ii. attainment of stable domestic prices 
iii. Attainment of growth in real income 
From 1965 to January 1973, Malawi operated within the sterling zone with the 
Malawi pound, later changed to Malawi kwacha in 1971, pegged at par to the British 
pound sterling. In November 1967, the British sterling was devalued by 14 percent 
and the Malawi pound followed suit by the same magnitude. During the same period 
the economy grew impressively and the balance of payments position was 
remarkable.  
With the collapse of the gold standard par value system the major currencies, the 
British sterling included, in the currency market became very volatile as these 
currencies shifted from pegging to the gold to a generalized floating system. From 
November 1973 to June 1975, the Malawi kwacha was pegged to a trade weighted 
 9
basket of the Pound and the US dollar. The Reserve Bank took an active exchange 
rate policy with announcements of devaluations and setting the daily buying and 
selling rates of the US dollar and the British pound sterling.  
There were persistent fluctuations in the two currencies, leading to authorities seeking 
a more permanent peg and the kwacha was pegged to the SDR in June 1975 until 
1984. This allowed the kwacha some measure of stability until early 1980s when the 
SDR started appreciating rapidly in tandem with appreciation of the dollar, forcing 
authorities to devalue the local currency against the SDR by 15 and 12 percent on 24 
April 1982 and 17 September 1983, respectively. The situation was exacerbated by 
external and internal shocks that rocked the Malawi economy, further worsening the 
country’s terms of trade. Because of the continued appreciation of the SDR, and the 
fact that the SDR did not properly represent the currencies of Malawi’s trading 
partners, the authorities decided to add the South African rand to the SDR basket in 
January 1984. Following this peg, the main thrust was to maintain external 
competitiveness by ensuring that real exchange rate (RER) was not appreciating. This 
was achieved by periodic devaluations of the kwacha especially that the rate of 
inflation in Malawi remained higher than that of trading partners’ currencies such as 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia and also due unfavourable movements in 
relative prices.  
From January 1984 through to February 1994, in an effort to recover from the 
worsening balance of payments position, the authorities pegged the kwacha to a trade 
weighted basket of seven currencies. The signs of recovery were manifested by 
improvements if the balance of payments position from –11.8 percent of GDP in 1983 
to –1.7 percent in 1984, but these were short-lived as increased transportation costs 
led to further deterioration in terms of trade. This resulted in authorities taking a 
series of active exchange rate policy stance. On April 2, 1984, the kwacha was 
devalued by 15 percent, followed by further devaluations by 10 percent on August 16, 
1986, 20 percent on February 7, 1987; 15 percent on January 16, 1988; 7 percent on 
March 24, 1990; 15 percent on 28 March 1992; and further 22 percent on July 11, 
1992. Progressively, it became apparent that the exchange rate was becoming heavily 
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politicized, with each devaluation becoming subject of intense speculation within the 
private sector. That led to weakening the level of confidence in the exchange system, 
and consequently a marked slowdown in repatriation of export proceeds. The 
situation was worsened by the cut in non-humanitarian assistance by bilateral donors 
and suspension of balance of payments support in 1992 because of governance issues.  
 
1.3.2.2 The Floatation of the kwacha 
 
In February 1994 Malawi adopted a managed float exchange rate regime.  This was 
aimed at resolving the foreign exchange crisis that had hit the country due to 
suspension of balance of payments support from donors, and the lagged effects of the 
1992/93 drought. The switch from the fixed regime to the floating one was meant to 
achieve certain objectives which can be summed up as: 
i. Improvement of the country’s export competitiveness, 
ii. Provision of an efficient foreign exchange allocation mechanism 
iii. Dampen speculative attacks on the Kwacha. Prior to the floatation, 
devaluations had become more frequent and very predictable thereby 
making the whole system very unstable. 
iv. Restoration of investor and donor confidence. The country’s foreign 
reserves had dwindled to such low levels that it was difficult to do 
business with the rest of the world. 
As a step towards market determination of the exchange rate, the monetary authorities 
authorized creation of a foreign exchange market administered by the RBM where 
weekly auctions of the foreign exchange market would take place. Buyers of the 
foreign exchange would bid through the commercial banks the price at which they 
wanted to buy a certain amount of foreign exchange. In the same way, sellers would 
determine their selling price and amounts. Successful bidders would then pay their 
bidding prices and not the clearing rate.  This, therefore, was adoption of a managed 
float exchange rate regime. Consequently, the exchange rate of the Kwacha against 
the US dollar depreciated from around K4.5 to over K17 during the period February 
to September 1994.  
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1.3.2.3 The Crawling band 
During the period 1995-97 the exchange rate fluctuated within a very narrow fixed 
band and accordingly foreign reserves were used to support the exchange rate. The 
main objective of attaining low inflation rates was achieved towards the end of 1997 
but at the expense of huge foreign exchange reserves and high interest rates, which 
were used to support the exchange rate.  Consequently, the real exchange rate 
appreciated and had a negative impact on the current account balance.  In other words 
the current account imbalance that emerged during the period of fixed exchange rates 
was being covered by a run down of reserves. 
 
1.3.2.4  An unannounced crawling peg 
 
 After achieving the inflation objective during 1997, the target of the monetary 
authorities was then to revive the lost competitiveness within a reasonable period of 
time.  It soon became clear that the narrow band had to be abandoned in favour of an 
unannounced crawling peg. During this period, the authorities were not committed to 
defend the currency thus the central parity rate was adjusted every time the maximum 
level (i.e. the upper limit of the band) was reached. Thus between 1997 and 1998 the 
exchange rate moved from around K15 to K38 to the US dollar. 
 
1.3.2.5  The ‘free-floating’ system 
This adjustment in the exchange rate brought back some competitiveness in the 
country’s foreign trade.  Consequently, the system was abandoned towards the end of 
1998 and the exchange rate started operating in a more market fashion – i.e. the ‘free-
floating’ system. This system saw Authorized Dealer Banks taking a more active role 
in determining the path for the Kwacha.  Consequently, and in part owing to the 
heavy depreciation of the kwacha in August, 1998, the kwacha dropped against the 
dollar by over 100.0 percent between January and December of that year. 
Developments in the exchange rates during 1999 reflected several factors, first ample 
supply of foreign exchange made possible by a health tobacco season which 
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contributed to the relative stability of the currency. Second, mid-way, into the year, 
speculation about another possible devaluation of the kwacha died down, enabling the 
currency to remain relatively stable. Third, the donor inflows, though lower than 
expected, also contributed much to the stability of the kwacha as these supported the 
foreign exchange reserve position. Finally, the recovery in the countries affected by 
the Asian crisis also helped achieve stability in the exchange rate as currencies of 
major trading partners stabilized. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the 
kwacha also came under pressure as the inflation differential between Malawi and her 
trading partners increased. In addition, the seasonal increase in demand for foreign 
exchange towards the end of the year also exerted a downward pressure on the 
currency. Reflecting these developments, the external value of the Malawi kwacha 
dropped by 6.5 percent against the US dollar between January and December, 1999. 
In 1999, the kwacha also depreciated by 4.1 percent against the British pound and 
17.4 percent against the Japanese yen. Over the same period, the kwacha appreciated 
in relation to the Euro, largely owing to the latter’s weakening vis-à-vis other 
currencies. The external value of the kwacha weakened substantially in 2000 
particularly starting the second quarter of the year. Several factors accounted for this 
development, both external and domestic. On the international scene, one of the 
factors is the growth in the US economy which resulted into strengthening of the US 
dollar against all major currencies. Subsequently, the Malawi kwacha weakened in 
attempt to maintain its competitiveness. On the domestic front, the collapse of 
tobacco prices at the auction floors had an adverse impact on the country’s reserve 
position. This together with the hoarding of foreign currency by some exporters and 
non-receipt of pledged donor support led to scarcity of foreign exchange on the 
market thereby putting pressure on the kwacha. Thus by end December, 2000, the 
external nominal value of the kwacha weakened by about 38.0 percent from the value 
observed at the end of 1999.  
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The free-float system, is perhaps remembered by the first ever appreciation of the 
Kwacha in 2001. Receipt of some donor inflows at the beginning of 2001 coupled 
with relatively higher average tobacco prices at the auction floor meant a favourable 
healthy foreign exchange position and this helped to dampen any speculative attacks 
on the kwacha. The kwacha consequently managed to firm up against most of other 
currencies. Similarly, the kwacha gained 18.3 percent, 19.9 percent and 26.6 percent 
against the British Pound, the Euro and Japanese Yen, respectively to reach K97.64 
per pound, K59.56 per euro and K0.51 per yen. Thus at the end of 2001, the kwacha 
contrary to most speculative sentiments, settled at a modest K67.29 per US dollar 
when viewed against the rate of K80.08 per US dollar at the end of 2000.  
 
A short period of exchange rate instability followed. In 2002, developments on both 
the local and international scene adversely affected the nominal value of the Malawi 
kwacha against the currencies of other trading partners. On the domestic market, 
despite improved receipts of from tobacco sales as compared to 2001, low donor 
inflows impacted negatively on the country’s reserve position. On the international 
scene, the United States economy performed below its projected growth with 
significant drop in the second quarter of year. As a result, the dollar weakened against 
other hard currencies, notably the Euro and the British pound. Consequently, by the 
end of December 2002, the Malawi kwacha had shed 29. 5 percent against the US 
dollar to close the year at K87.14 per dollar. Similarly the kwacha weakened against 
the Euro and the Japanese yen by 53.4 percent and 43.3 percent to K91.36 per euro 
and K0.70 per yen, respectively. Against the British pound, the kwacha slid to 
K139.73 per pound from K97.64 per pound as at end December 2001. 
 
1.3.2.6 The Managed float  
 
A policy decision was taken in August 2003 to stabilize the Kwacha at a rate of K108 
against the United States dollar. The decision was in response to serious economic 
disequilibrium or instability following the suspension of the first IMF PRGF and the 
resultant droughts in the early 2000s. 
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The kwacha –US dollar remained largely unchanged from August 2003 until mid-
March 2005 when a series of adjustments saw the Kwacha resting at K123 against the 
United States dollar. The stability of the kwacha during the larger part of 2004 was as 
a result of the involvement of the Reserve Bank of Malawi in buying United States 
dollars direct from farmers at the auction floors. This arrangement was necessitated 
by the misunderstanding that arose between tobacco farmers and the commercial 
banks regarding delays in crediting the farmers’ accounts after the sale of their 
tobacco and the exchange rate used in the conversions. This arrangement was, 
however, not normal as it was not in keeping with the liberalized foreign exchange 
regime Malawi adopted in 1994. However, in view of the importance of the tobacco 
industry in the country, and in the face of a deadlock between farmers and the 
commercial banks, the Reserve Bank had to step in to save the situation. The Kwacha 
then stabilized at those levels until early 2006, when economic conditions 
necessitated a further review2. 
 
Figure 1: Daily exchange rates (2002-2005) 
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2 Currently, the Reserve Bank is no longer involved in the purchase of dollars from farmers on the auction 
floors. This follows an agreement between the two parties after their Reserve Bank-brokered discussions 
earlier this year. The farmers are now able to get their proceeds within 24 hours of the sale documents 
being submitted to their bankers and the exchange rate used in the conversion is the one displayed on the 
day of the sale.  
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 1.3.2.7 The Current Exchange Rate Policy 
The current managed float exchange rate system was adopted in response to many 
economic challenges like persistent excess demand for foreign exchange, frequent 
droughts and market failures, among others, which rendered the free float system 
ineffective.  The exchange rate is aligned with major objectives, that is, maintaining a 
sustainable BoP position, attaining stable domestic prices    and attainment of growth 
in real income. It is the intention of monetary authorities to place more reliance on 
market based instruments in regulating the kwacha’s value. However, moral suasion 
would be used if deemed necessary. It is not surprising therefore to see the kwacha on 
a weakening voyage – depreciating against all major currencies in May to average 
K138.75 (K134.74 in April 2006) against the US dollar, K22.45 (K22.24 in April 
2006) against the South African rand, and K176.61 (K165.03 in April 2006) against 
the Euro.    
1.3.3  Foreign Exchange Market Intervention  
The medium term objective of the Reserve Bank is to have the kwacha fully market 
determined and build foreign exchange reserves, but at the same time the monetary 
authorities do recognize the importance to investors, of a predictable currency value.  
In a liberalized foreign exchange market, the RBM cannot dictate the value of the 
Malawi kwacha. However, the RBM can only influence the value of the kwacha by 
buying foreign exchange when there is an excess supply in the market and selling 
when there is shortage. This means that in theory, the RBM can maintain a stable 
exchange rate by intervening in foreign exchange market. In practice, however, the 
RBM has to consider the monetary implications as well as implications on the 
position of official foreign reserves. As the Bank buys foreign exchange from the 
market, the supply of the Malawi kwacha in the economy increases and this has 
potential for inflationary pressures. For the Reserve Bank to sell foreign exchange to 
the market, it must have adequate reserves in the first place. And, as a source of its 
own foreign exchange reserves, the Reserve Bank also relies on whatever it is able to 
buy from the market and/or, if there were any inflows of donor funds. Any constraints 
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on these two sources, means inadequate capacity for the Bank to support the market 
effectively, thereby affecting the surplus/demand balance in the market.  The major 
players in the foreign exchange market in Malawi are the two major commercial 
banks (Authorized Dealer Banks), the tobacco companies (Limbe Leaf, STANCOM), 
the Sugar Company (ILLOVO), and the foreign exchange bureaux.  
 
Overall, since the floatation of the kwacha in 1994, there has been limited to meeting 
net international reserve target moderating seasonal fluctuation related primarily to 
the agricultural cycle. Due to the seasonal nature of our foreign exchange earnings 
coupled with the fact that tobacco exports account for about 60 percent of the foreign 
exchange earnings, the Malawi kwacha is normally expected to appreciate during the 
tobacco marketing season (April to August), reflecting increased supply of foreign 
exchange on the market, and depreciate during the off-season reflecting increased 
demand for foreign exchange as the economy imports farm inputs such as fertilizer. 
This seasonal pattern may vary if during that time of the year, the country has 
received substantial donor inflows. Daily purchases or sales are limited to 10US$mn, 
while on weekly and monthly basis, they go up to 15US$mn and US$35mn, 
respectively. The size and frequency of daily net purchases range from (-) US$1.0 
million to US$10.0 million. On weekly basis the net purchases range from (-) US$16 
million to US$15 million while on monthly basis they range from from (-) US$25.0 
million to US$35.0 million.  
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Figure 2: Monthly Exchange rates and Net foreign exchange sales  
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Activity in the foreign exchange market is divided into segments – transactions 
between banks and their clients, and inter-bank activity including the RBM’s 
intervention in the market. Average daily turnover volume in the first segment of 
foreign exchange market was about US$13.5 million in 2002. Inter-bank activity was 
much lower however, more than 75 percent of which was characterized by official 
intervention.  
 
1.3.4 The Parallel Market 
The parallel market has existed for a long time. This market exists to meet the needs 
of foreign exchange customers whose needs cannot be satisfied in the authorized 
dealer banks (ADBs) or bureaus. Continuation of activities in the parallel market 
reflects that there are distortions in the official market and its exchange rates should 
reflect the actual market rates. The activities in this market cannot objectively be 
measured; however, the gap between the bureau exchange rates and the parallel rates 
is not very large. The rates also tend to be stable following the movements in the 
official exchange rates. The parallel market is preferred because it allows for faster 
purchase or selling of foreign exchange without disclosing much information. 
However, there is a high risk associated with dealing with operators in this market 
mainly associated with obtaining the local or foreign currencies that are not genuine 
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and if the law catches with money changer, then prosecution will follow. This has 
made it difficult to obtain any information regarding operations in this market 
 
Participants in the parallel market are not defined, especially as there is no legal 
recognition accorded to operators and there are no direct regulations, however there 
seem to be a lot of information sharing among dealers in this market.  Usually the 
exchange rates in this market are similar among dealers in different places within the 
city of Lilongwe, for example and between the dealers in different cities of the 
country. The only marked difference in rates exist between dealers in major cities and 
those at the borders with neighbouring countries, with the latter having lower rates in 
most cases than the former. 
Establishment of Foreign Exchange Bureaus 
In order to incorporate parallel market into the legal foreign exchange system in 
Malawi, foreign exchange bureaus were granted permission to operate from mid 
1990s. Operators in the bureau de change are private entrepreneurs who have been 
formally recognized by government to deal in foreign exchange and provide access to 
foreign exchange in a convenient and informal manner.  
Foreign exchange is primarily sourced from private individuals, including businesses 
people who are unable to deal at authorized dealer banks. From their inception there 
has been a general movement of exchange rates in the bureaus de changes towards 
that of parallel market. By June 2004, while the official rate was K108.8858 per US 
dollar, the bureau de change exchange rate and parallel rate were K110.0000 and 
K118.0000, respectively (see below). This trend continued, with the explanation for 
this as excess demand for foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market eventually 
transferred to the bureau de change to attract higher prices. Again, the very simple 
nature of transactions in this market compared with the foreign exchange market plus 
relative lower risk – e.g fake currency transactions – to the parallel market, make it 
attractive for consumers to prefer dealing with bureau de changes operators. This 
drives up demand and, consequently, the exchange rate. 
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Figure 3: Official and Parallel exchange rate trends 
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Figure 4 shows exchange rate premium. Exchange rate premium is measured by the 
difference between official exchange rate and parallel exchange rate. Other measures of 
premium are the difference between official exchange rate and bureau de change rates. It 
should however be noted that the suggestion that parallel rate is the optimal rate is 
controversial. Given the fact that the official market’s share of the foreign exchange 
market is much larger, the realistic market rate may lie somewhere between the official 
exchange rate and parallel market rate. The increasing gap between official exchange rate 
and parallel exchange rate justifies some analyst’s view that the Malawi kwacha is 
overvalued. Even though all markets are imperfect, the official market is the leading 
market.  
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Figure 4: parallel exchange rate premium 
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3.0    Literature Review 
3.1 Theory of Intervention3
There is general agreement in literature unsterilized sale of foreign exchange would 
be expected, other things being equal, to appreciate the exchange rate through 
contraction of money supply and therefore interest rates.  Sterilized intervention is 
where the authorities take deliberate action to offset foreign exchange market 
intervention with an equal change in the net domestic credit and this happens either 
simultaneously or with some short lag, while leaving interest rates unchanged. On the 
other hand, intervention is non-sterilized when it is conducted without any action 
taken to offset the impact of intervention. The relationship between exchange rates 
and monetary control largely comes from central banks balance sheet. On the 
liabilities side, there is the base money (BM) which comprises reserves, currency and 
the central bank’s net worth. On the assets aside, there is net foreign assets (NFA) and 
                                                 
3 This section relies heavily on Simatele (2004) 
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net domestic assets (NDA). Any intervention in the foreign exchange market will 
change NFA (Simatele, 2004). Assuming that net worth is insignificant, a summary of 
the balance sheet can be presented as:  
                            BM = NFA + NDA 
Sterilization needs the central bank to take deliberate action such as open market 
operation sales or purchases of securities. Once this is done, the result will be an 
equal change in domestic assets. Without sterilization, the monetary base also 
changes i.e.  
                                  ∆BM = ∆NFA  
The size of sterilization largely depends on the extent to which simultaneous changes 
take place in NDA as NFA changes (Simatele, 2004). Full sterilization happens when 
changes in NFA are totally offset by changes in NDA, thus the expression: 
                                - ∆NFA = ∆NDA        
and  
                                    ∆BM = 0 
In this case there would be no impact on the monetary base. The changes will 
eventually result into changes in broader money aggregates and interest rates. This in 
consequent will affect expectations, capital inflows and eventually the exchange rate.  
 3.1.2  Sterilized Intervention  
Sterilised intervention4 can affect exchange rate through two channels. These 
are the portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel. 
 
                                                 
4 The Reserve Bank of Malawi sterilizes its foreign exchange market intervention whenever it is perceived that 
intervention in foreign exchange market will affect reserve money targets to the extent that the targets will be missed. 
Since, money targets are usually tight; the Bank therefore often sterilizes its foreign exchange market 
intervention. 
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3.1.2.1 The Portfolio Balance Channel 
This one states that sterilising intervention through typical open market operations 
will change the currency composition of government securities held by the public 
(Humpage, 2003). A sterilised purchase of foreign exchange, for example, increases 
the amount held domestic bonds held by the public relative to foreign bonds, resulting 
in a depreciation of the local currency. Unfortunately, most empirical studies find the 
relationship to be statistically insignificant. The reason offered for the lack of a 
portfolio effect is that the typical intervention transaction is minor relative to the 
stock of outstanding assets. Dominguez (1998) is a notable exception to this 
conclusion.   
3.1.2.2 Signalling Channel 
The second channel is the signalling or expectations channel.  Mussa (1981) 
suggested that central banks might give indications regarding future, unanticipated 
changes in monetary policy through their sterilised interventions, with sales or 
purchases of foreign exchange implying, respectively, monetary tightening or ease.  
This would have direct implications for future fundamentals, and traders would 
immediately adjust spot exchange rate quotations. Mussa suggested that such signals 
could be particularly strong – more so than a mere announcement of monetary policy 
intentions – because interventions give monetary authorities open positions in foreign 
currencies that would result in losses if they failed to confirm their signal. Reeves 
(1997) has formalised Mussa’s approach and has demonstrated that if the signal is not 
fully realistic, or if the market does not use all available information, then the 
response of the exchange rate intervention ill be low.  However, Edison (1993) argues 
that intervention is effective and occurs through both the portfolio balance and 
signalling channels.    
 3.2     Empirical Findings 
Andrew and Broadbent (1994) in their work on the effectiveness of official 
intervention in the Australian dollar market found out that in the first ten years of the 
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floatation of the Australian dollar (1983 – 94) the Reserve Bank of Australia foreign 
exchange operations resulted in the stability of the Australian dollar. Makin and Shaw 
(1997) concluded that the official intervention during 1983-93 had neither influenced 
the Australian dollar nor smoothened its volatility. Bonser - Neal et al. (1998) and 
Humpage (1999) show that the interventions undertaken together with changes in the 
federal funds rate do not have any effect on exchange rates. Both results attribute 
exchange rate responses mainly to the federal funds rate. However Kearns and 
Rogobon (2002) support the view that over the period 1986-93, RBA intervention did 
have an economically significant effect in moving the level of exchange rate. Using 
daily data covering the 1983-97 period, Kim and Sheen (2002) and Kim, Kortian and 
Sheen (2002) conclude that the RBA was cautious in choosing when to intervene and 
that its intervention stabilised the volatility of Australian dollar.   In contrast, Kim 
(2003) claims important effects from intervention in a VAR model that allows for the 
possible interactions between exchange rate intervention and monetary policies. 
Kim’s results are unusual and questionable, but they highlight the need for further 
research on this issue.  
Even though most empirical studies do not provide the best theoretical model of 
intervention, economists usually interpret their results as evidence of a broad 
signalling channel. These results clearly show a high frequency (daily) relationship 
between foreign exchange intervention and exchange rates. 
Simatete (2004) investigates the effect of central bank intervention on the Zambian 
kwacha. She used a GARCH (1,1) model simultaneously estimating the effect of 
intervention on the mean and variance. She finds that central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market increases the mean but reduces the volatility of the Zambian 
kwacha. The explanation supports the ‘speculative bandwagon’ and a ‘leaning against 
the wind’ strategy. Although there is no attempt to distinguish through which channel 
intervention works, she argues that this is more likely to be a signalling affect rather 
that a portfolio balance. 
 24
Many researchers also consider the second moment of the exchange rate process 
finding that intervention typically increases currency volatility. They often interpret 
this finding has evidence of a destabilising effect, but in a market that has information 
imperfections, volatility may be associated with transmission of new information. If 
so, one would expect an increase in exchange rate volatility around intervention 
periods. 
4.0     Methodology 
In both macroeconomic and financial economics, empirical research is based on time 
series, and time series is generally viewed as stochastic processes. The model builder 
is therefore allowed to use statistical inference in developing and testing equations 
that describe the relationships between economic variables. The two key properties of 
many economic time series that have been common in research work are 
nonstationarity and time-varying volatility. Foreign exchange market intervention 
falls under the second property, as such an action would result into unpredictable 
volatility. Researchers have attempted to model foreign exchange market intervention 
using various methodologies and approaches. The broad range of techniques present 
researchers with different types of problems about which anyone assessing their 
results needs to be careful. The main problem in all empirical research on intervention 
is the simultaneous determination of official intervention and exchange rate changes.  
4.1 Alternative approaches 
In this study we considered a number of approaches to modelling foreign exchange   
market intervention and economic responses. 
Event study: an incident of intervention is defined as a period of days with official 
intervention in foreign exchange in one direction, including up to ten days of no 
further intervention between the initial and subsequent intervention transaction. It 
requires systematic intervention transactions (Humpage, 1999). A quick look at 
Malawi’s experience shows that intervention transactions are not systematic. It takes 
long periods between one official purchase or sale of foreign exchange to the next. 
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VAR models: structural VAR models have been used to identify dynamic responses of 
an economy to particular shocks and this reveals the information about the dynamic 
properties of the economy that is being investigated. The results can be used to 
inform policy makers and economic forecasters how economic variables such as 
exchange rate and prices respond over time to changes in policy or other events. 
However, the discrete values and periodic nature of intervention make it difficult to 
estimate parameter values of reaction functions in a VAR (Kim, 2003). 
 
Econometric model: lagged models are inappropriate since intervention appears to 
affect exchange rate movements within minutes and hours (Humpage, 1999). 
 
The GARCH/ARCH models: ARCH Volatility in asset returns and exchange rates 
tend to gather around their marginal distributions. Modelling such time varying 
volatility was initiated by Robert Engel through autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH). In order to go around this problem Bollerslev (1986) 
proposed a generalised ARCH or GARCH (p, q) model. This is the model we adopt 
in this study, it is particularly favoured to take account of variance correlations 
typically found in financial data. The Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model is robust to various types of misspecification, can 
simultaneously model conditional mean and conditional (Edison, 1999). 
4.2 The adopted methodology 
We adopt the GARCH methodology. The first-order (p=q=1) GARCH model, 
suggested by Taylor (1986), has since become the most popular ARCH model in 
practice. Compared to the Engel’s basic ARCH model, the GARCH model is a 
useful improvement that allows a parsimonious specification. The GARCH (p, q) 
model on which the study is based takes the form: 
       (1) ∑ ∑
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where α0>0, αi≥0 for i=1,2, …., q and b≥0 for i=1,2,….,p. The GARCH (p, q) model 
successfully captures several characteristics of financial time series such as volatility.  
The study estimates and tests ARCH models, that is, builds the ARCH into GARCH 
(p, q) model using the Eviews. Initially we regress y on x by OLS and obtain the 
residuals {εt}; then we compute the OLS regression ε2t=α0+α1ε2t+…+αpε2t-p+error; 
and test the joint significance of α…α1. The hypothesis of interest is the extent to 
which changes in the conditional mean and conditional variance are associated with 
changes in the intervention variable. The general formulation of the model follows 
Edison and Liang (1999); but adjusted to suit the Malawi situation: 
  ∆EXt = σ0 + + σ1NSt + σ2PDRSA+ σ3EP+σ4DMV+εt  (2) 
  
ε t | It-1| ∼ N (0, ht)       (3) 
  
ht = βo + β1  NS+ σε2 t-1 + δ h t-1     (4) 
   
Where ∆EXt = log change in Malawi kwacha/United States dollar (MK/US$), NS is 
net sales of foreign exchange (representing intervention), PDRSA is inflation 
differential between Malawi and Republic of South Africa (RSA), EP is parallel 
exchange rate premium, DMV is dummy variable for seasonal trends in exchange 
rates, ε is a regression disturbance (forecast error), ⏐⏐is absolute value operator, It-1 is 
information set through time t-1, h is the time-varying variance ofε. 
Equation 2 measures the direct effect of net sales of foreign exchange (US dollars), 
price differential, exchange rate premium and seasonal factors on exchange rate 
changes. A positive coefficient on intervention variable indicates that net sales of the 
foreign currency (NS) depreciate the Malawi kwacha. Equation 3, (ε t | I t-1  | ∼ N (0, 
ht) states that the regression residuals will be modeled as a GARCH process. 
Equation 4 describes the conditional variance. The parameters of the model will be 
estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood approach of Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge (1992), which yields standard errors that are robust to non-normality in 
the density function underlying the residuals. Parameters σ and δ in equation 4 are for 
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the ARCH and GARCH terms, respectively. The ARCH term (ε2t-1) measures 
volatility from previous period measured as a lag of the squared residual from the 
mean equation. The GARCH term (ht-1) measures the last period’s forecast variance. 
 
4.3  Data 
 
We use monthly data series which includes exchange rate (EX), net sales of foreign 
exchange as intervention variable (NS), inflation differential between Malawi and 
RSA (PDRSA), parallel exchange rate premium (EP) and dummy variable for 
seasonality in exchange rate developments (DMV). We use nominal bilateral 
exchange rate of the Malawi kwacha against the US dollar. Parallel exchange rate 
premium is the difference between official exchange rate and parallel exchange rate. 
All variables are expressed in logs except for net sales. 
 
5.0  Estimation and Results    
 
5.1 Time Series properties of the data 
We first conduct a descriptive analysis of the data for the first part of the study. 
Table 1 shows that the variables do not follow a normal distribution. The second 
step is to test for unit root in the variables.  
 
Table 1: Data distribution 
 
Variable Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Normality 
NS 5.071250 14.606000 -0.467366 4.067161 4.192828 
EX 101.4513 17.29165 -0.341316 1.957089 3.236769 
PDRSA 4.950000 3.727463 0.680481 2.398785 4.612578 
EP 10.82800 7.367356 -0.056362 2.293603 1.066048 
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Table 2: Phillips Perron Unit root test  
 
      Variable  Level  1st Difference    
  
        EP      -1.5877054 -7.391786*   
        EX                      -2.289211 -5.096791* 
        NS                     -6.293474* 
        PDRSA  -1.486199  -5.478247* 
 Where * implies that the variable is significant at 5 percent level of significance 
 
The results show that variables such as exchange rate (EX), exchange rate premium (EP), 
and price differential between Malawi and South Africa (PDRSA) are non-stationary 
(integrated of order one) and thus become stationary after first difference. On the other 
hand, net sales of foreign exchange (NS) is stationary (integrated of order zero) 
 
The next step is to find out whether RBM intervention (net sales of foreign exchange) in 
foreign exchange market in Malawi affects the kwacha. Seasonal dummies are introduced 
for seasonal trends in kwacha movements. We set off by running an OLS equation of the 
exchange rate deprecations on a constant, the net sales of foreign exchange, parallel 
exchange rate premium and inflation differential (to take care of balance of payments 
pressure) and seasonal dummy variable (to take care of seasonal trends in kwacha 
fluctuations). The results are indicated in table 2 below.  
 
Table 3: Conditional Mean Equation 
   Coefficient  Std. Error t-statistic prob 
C   0.001440  0.006191 0.232587 0.6172 
DMV   0.006142  0.00753 0.814969 0.2195  
∆LNPDRSA (-1) 0.006078  0.003003 2.024214 0.04452 
∆EP   0.000416  0.000922 20.451010 0.6822 
NS   0.001467  0.000255 1.834534 0.0343 
R-squared   0.414862 
D_W test   1.525484 
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The results find that net sales of foreign exchange by the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
depreciate the kwacha. The results also indicate that price differentials between Malawi 
and South Africa affect the kwacha. As the price differentials widen, the kwacha tends to 
depreciate. It is also necessary to find out whether net sales of foreign exchange affect the 
volatility of the kwacha. We conduct ARCH tests on the residuals of the conditional 
mean equation to test for the presence of ARCH effects. The Results are presented below: 
ARCH Test 
F-statistic   0.26245  probability 0.0355 
Obs*R-squared 0.28527  probability 0.0285 
Figure 5: The Residuals are heteroskedastic 
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Results from the ARCH tests indicate that we reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH 
effects in the equation. Since there is presence of ARCH effects (i.e. presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals), we then proceed to estimate a GARCH (1,1) model 
and simultaneously estimate the effect of net sales of foreign exchange on both the mean 
and volatility of the kwacha.   
 
In this study, we use GARCH method to model the heteroscedastic errors in our 
conditional mean equation. Compared to the Engel’s basic ARCH model, the GARCH 
model is a useful improvement that allows a parsimonious specification (it is robust to 
various types of misspecification. This approach is also beneficial because it allows us to 
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simultaneously test the effect of intervention on both the mean and conditional volatility 
of kwacha. The results are indicated in the table below: 
 
Table 4: GARCH estimation of exchange rate  
 
     Conditional mean equation 
   Coeff.  Std.Error z-statistic prob. 
NS   0.005180 0.000131 1.380607 0.0474 
∆LNPDRSA (-1) 0.001694 0.001685 3.973908 0.0001 
∆EP (-1)   0.000436 0.000558 0.780752 0.4349 
DMV   0.004593 0.003486 1.139680 0.2544 
C   0.004593 0.003393 1.353630 0.1759 
 
     Conditional variance equation 
C   2.5206  1.298662 0.19415 0.6584 
NS   -1.6289 0.35658 0.20635 0.0025 
ARCH (ε2 t-1)  0.056893 0.010376 -5.426136 0.0000 
GARCH (h t-1)  1.073047 0.031253  34.33400 0.0000 
 
The results show that net sales of foreign exchange by the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
depreciate the kwacha. This effect is very small, however. When the RBM sells foreign 
exchange with the intention of appreciating the kwacha, the kwacha depreciates instead.5  
Since the Malawi economy has low levels of foreign reserves, and considering that most 
foreign exchange sales are conducted during the lean period of foreign exchange, the 
result suggests that the Reserve Bank foreign exchange sales are simply meant to reduce 
the rate of depreciation of the kwacha. In literature, this result is generally interpreted as 
‘leaning against the wind.’ In other words, the Reserve Bank foreign exchange sales are 
simply meant to reduce the rate of depreciation of the kwacha.   
                                                 
5 This reflects an endogeneity problem. In other words, we are picking up influences from an RBM reaction 
function rather than isolating the impact of intervention. This suggests that RBM is choosing a positive 
value for NS whenever it thinks EX is going to be too big. What we are estimating is some combination of 
intervention parameter and reaction function parameter.  
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 We may also suspect that the results are reflecting speculation in the foreign exchange 
market. Typical of small economies, even after a Reserve Bank sale, the dollar tends to 
quickly dry out on the market due small magnitudes of foreign exchange sales. What 
happens is that market speculators tend to buy as much foreign exchange as is possible 
after foreign exchange sales by the Reserve Bank and then withhold the foreign exchange 
till the exchange rate rises again and then they sell afterwards6. This form of speculation 
may be the result of the fact that since the kwacha was floated in February 2004, the 
nominal exchange rate has on continuously been on the depreciating trend (from K4.5/US 
dollar in 1994 to K138.65/US dollar as of end August 2006).  
 
It must however be noted that, while the effect of net sales of foreign exchange on the 
kwacha is statistically significant, it is not economically significant. In particular, for the 
full sample period, a US$10 million sales of foreign exchange is associated with a rather 
0.05 percent depreciation of the Malawi kwacha.7
 
The results also indicate that price differentials between Malawi and South Africa affect 
the kwacha. As price differentials widen, the kwacha tends to depreciate. It must be noted 
that South Africa is Malawi’s major trading partners with a weight of bout 48 percent. So 
any price differentials between the two countries have consequent effects on the kwacha. 
Similarly, higher exchange rate premium tend to depreciate the kwacha. 
 
We also find that RBM intervention decreases the volatility of the kwacha as evidenced 
by the negative sign of net sales of foreign exchange variable in the variance model. This 
implies that the Reserve Bank of Malawi is able to achieve its goal of smoothing out 
fluctuations of the kwacha. From the graphical exposition of the exchange rate 
movements, it is clear that he Reserve Bank of Malawi was able to stabilize the kwacha 
successfully in the larger part of the year 2004. A policy decision was taken in August 
2003 to stabilize the Kwacha at a rate of K108.94 against the United States dollar. The 
                                                 
6 See Simatele (2004)  
7 This result is consistent with findings by  Edison (1999) 
 32
decision was in response to serious economic disequilibrium or instability following the 
suspension of the first IMF- PRGF and the resultant droughts in the early 2000s. The 
kwacha–US dollar exchange rate remained largely unchanged from August 2003 until 
mid-March 2005 when a series of adjustments saw the Kwacha resting at K123 against 
the United States dollar. The Kwacha then stabilized at those levels until early 2006, 
when economic conditions necessitated a further review. The ARCH (σ) and GARCH (δ) 
terms are both positive and statistically significant.  
 
6.0     Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
The paper analyses the effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions carried out 
by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. The paper uses monthly data of Reserve Bank of Malawi 
intervention (net sales of foreign exchange), and exchange rate data, among others, over a 
four year period. We start off by running a conditional mean equation using changes in 
exchange rate as regressor. The results show the presence of ARCH effects. With the 
presence of ARCH effects, we then move ahead to run a GARCH (1,1) model by quasi-
maximum likelihood. In line with similar findings elsewhere in the literature, the paper 
finds that net sales of dollars by the Reserve Bank of Malawi depreciate, rather than 
appreciate, the kwacha. This effect is very small however. Moreover, the paper also finds 
that the Reserve Bank of Malawi intervention reduces the volatility of the kwacha.  
 
This shows that the Reserve Bank of Malawi actually achieves its objective of smoothing 
out fluctuation of the kwacha. This can be evidenced by the stability of the kwacha in a 
larger part of 2004. Thus intervention is, to some extent, used as an effective tool for 
moderating fluctuations of the Malawi kwacha. However, its effectiveness is constrained 
by the amounts of foreign exchange reserves, which are usually low. In the short-term, 
therefore, the Bank has to do a lot of balancing in managing the exchange rate to ensure 
that the achievement of a stable exchange rate, which is good for the economy, does not 
come at the expense of inflation and the depletion of foreign reserves.  In the medium to 
long-term, efforts must be directed at transforming the economy into a producing and 
exporting one so that enough foreign exchange is generated to ensure success of foreign 
exchange interventions. 
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Appendix: Table A (1):   Variables  
 
Variable name   Variable description 
Ext      Malawi Kwacha – United States Dollar exchange rate 
 NS   Net sales of foreign exchange capturing Reserve Bank of 
Malawi interventions   
 DMV     dummy variable for seasonal trends in exchange rates 
 EP                                 parallel exchange rate premium 
 PDRSA    inflation differential between Malawi and RSA 
   ⏐⏐     the absolute value operator 
   It      the information set through time t-1 
   εt      the disturbance term 
   ε2 t-1    ARCH term 
   h t-1    GARCH term 
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